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A NOT-SO EQUITABLE ALLOCATION: THE NEED FOR AN
ENVIRONMENTAL COST PRINCIPLE+
Captain Joshua H. Van Eaton*
INTRODUCTION
The President recently called for fiscal responsibility within the
federal government by issuing Executive Order 13423, directing all
federal agencies to conduct their respective missions "in an
environmentally, economically and fiscally sound, integrated,
manner."
and sustainable
continuously improving, efficient,
parts that
the
many
moving
Unfortunately, within a given agency,
comprise the whole often operate with indifference to one another's
distinct and separate missions. When the proverbial left and right hands do
not know what the other is doing, inefficiency frequently results. When a
business operates inefficiently, its profit margin suffers and its
shareholders decide whether or not to continue investing in that business.
When the government operates inefficiently, its shareholders, the tax
payers, just keep paying. This article will explore the lack of coordination
between two significant Department of Defense ("DOD") activities,
procurement and environmental cleanup, identify the conflicting policies
that lead to inefficiencies between these two activities, and propose a step
toward resolving those inefficiencies.
The need to prudently manage tax dollars, ever-widening deficits,
and growing long-range fiscal challenges requires DOD to maximize its
return on investment while simultaneously providing warfighters with
The positions and opinions stated in this article are those of the author and do not
represent the views of the United Sates government, the Department of Defense, or the
United States Army.
* Judge Advocate, U.S. Army. Presently assigned as a Litigation Attorney,
Environmental Law Division, United States Army Legal Services Agency. J.D., 2001,
Baylor University School of Law; B.A., 1997, Seattle Pacific University. I would like to
thank the following individuals: Michael J. Berrigan, MAJ(R), U.S. Army, for his
mentorship and encouragement in this undertaking; and LTC(R) Dale N. Johnson, Linda
Serret, and CPT JJ Merriam for their editing and comments.
' See Exec. Order No. 13423, 72 Fed. Reg. 3919 (Jan. 26, 2007).
+
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world class capabilities at the best value by spending funds wisely and
buying the "right things, the right way."2 The General Accountability
Office ("GAO"), Congress's investigative arm, recently reported that
DOD spending on goods and services has increased by 88% since fiscal
year 2000 to nearly $270 billion in fiscal year 2005. DOD reports that its
environmental liabilities, the second largest financial liability in DOD
behind pensions and salaries, constitute nearly 4% of DOD's $1.7 trillion
total financial liabilities.4 Over the past 10 years, DOD invested almost
$43.4 billion to ensure the success of its environmental programs.5 DOD
procurement liabilities are "voluntarily" created by contracting to purchase
goods and services, and are satisfied with funds appropriated by Congress
for the specific purpose of buying those goods and services. On the other
hand, DOD environmental liabilities are "involuntarily" created by federal
statute, incurred through litigation or by regulation, and are satisfied with
a few distinct appropriations or "pots of money," depending on how the
specific liabilities are incurred.
Environmental laws and regulations require liable parties to bear
the financial burden of their own equitable share of the cleanup costs
under "the polluter pays" principle. Many DOD contaminated sites
involved activities by private parties - often government contractors - who

share liability for the contamination with DOD. Courts frequently allocate
liability for environmental cleanup costs at such sites between DOD and
its contractors, to each their own "fair share," based upon activities
resulting from defense contracts of decades past. Many of these same
contractors continue to do business with DOD today. In doing so, they
2 See U.S. Gov'T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DEP'T
OF DEF. ACQUIsITIONS:

GAO-06-800T (2006) (testimony of David M.
Walker, Comptroller General of the U.S.), available at http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d06800t.pdf.
CONTRACTING FOR BETTER OUTCOMES,

3

id.

4See Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations
& Environment)

Environmental Management Office, EnvironmentalLiability, available at
https://www.denix.osd.mil/denix/Public/Library/Cleanup/CleanupOfc/currentfocus/liabi
lity.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2007).
5
See FISCAL YEAR 2005 DEFENSE ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION PROGRAM ANNUAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS: DEFENSE ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS, at 2 (2005), availableat
https://www.denix.osd.mil/denix/Public/News/OSD/DEP2005/dep-body.pdf [hereinafter
FY 2005 DERP Report].
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often charge a portion of their court allocated "fair share" of
environmental cleanup costs at a given site right back to the government
as overhead (or, in simple business terms, the "cost of doing business").
The net result is that often one or more polluters - government contractors
- may not pay and the other polluter - the government - may pay twice.

This practice, while perfectly legal under current federal acquisition law,
can hardly be characterized as prudent stewardship of taxpayer funds, or
as economically and fiscally sound business practice.
This article addresses the need to coordinate DOD's environmental
and procurement functions to address the inequities resulting from
contractors passing on part of their "fair share" of previously incurred
environmental cleanup costs to the government, and ultimately, to the
taxpayer, as overhead in current government contracts. Part I outlines how
the United States primarily incurs environmental liabilities, including a
review of CERCLA's creation and its liability scheme, the Defense
Environmental Restoration Program ("DERP"), and how environmental
liabilities are paid. Part II discusses the basic guidelines for the
allowability of environmental costs under the current defense procurement
contracting scheme and the resultant ability of government contractors to
pass on many of their environmental costs to the taxpayers. It also
addresses a prior failed attempt to promulgate an environmental cost
principle. Part III details DOD's past failure to seek environmental costsharing partners and its resulting affirmative environmental claims policy.
Part IV proposes the promulgation of an environmental cost principle in
light of conflicting interests inherent in DOD's procurement and
environmental cleanup activities. Such a principle would remedy the
subjectivity of the current cost scheme by creating a common set of
guidelines to assist DOD in executing its primary mission "in an
environmentally, economically and fiscally sound, integrated,
continuously improving, efficient, and sustainable manner." 6

6

See supranote 1.
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I. FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: How DOD INCURS AND PAYS
FOR ITS ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITIES
A. The Basics of CERCLA's Liability Scheme and "The PolluterPays"
Principle
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act ("CERCLA") is the primary federal statute addressing the
cleanup of hazardous waste sites resulting from past activities.7 CERCLA
establishes a framework under which four categories of potentially
responsible parties ("PRPs") may be liable for the costs to clean up
releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, or contaminants. A
cornerstone of the CERCLA liability scheme is the "polluter pays"
principle, which is akin to equitable restitution. That is, those who create
pollution should ultimately be responsible for the costs of cleaning it up.1 0
"Responsible" parties include: (1) current owners and operators of
facilities" where hazardous substances have been disposed;12 (2) previous
owners or operators of facilities at the time of the disposal of hazardous
substances;' (3) persons who, by contract, agreement, or otherwise,
arranged, directly or indirectly, for disposal or treatment of hazardous
substances;14 and (4) persons who transported hazardous substances to a
disposal or treatment facility selected by them. The United States, a
State, or in certain circumstances, a private party may bring an action
against a responsible party to recover cleanup costs under CERCLA's
liability scheme. CERCLA was amended in 1986 by the Superfund
Amendment and Reauthorization Act ("SARA") which expressly applied
'42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2006).
842 U.S.C. § 9601(22).
942 U.S.C § 9601(14).
io United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506, 1514 (11th Cir. 1997), (citing Redwing
Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1501-1502 (11th Cir. 1996))
(internal citations omitted) ("An essential purpose of CERCLA is to place the ultimate
responsibility for the cleanup of hazardous waste on 'those responsible"').
"42 U.S.C. § 9601(8)(A) & (B).
142

342
14 42

U.S.C.

9607(a)(1) (2006).

U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2).
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (also called "arrangers").
" 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (also called "transporters").
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CERCLA to facilities owned and operated by a department, agency, or
instrumentality of the United States "in the same manner and to the same
extent" that it applies to non-governmental facilities.' 6 As part of SARA,
Congress also created the DERP, specifically codify'ing DOD
environmental responsibilities.' 7 The DERP operates within the overall
CERCLA framework and provides for the cleanup of hazardous waste at
DOD facilities.' 8
CERCLA liability is strict,19 retroactive, 2 0 and joint and several. 2 1
Only three complete defenses to CERCLA liability exist, and they are
rarely applicable. 22 Therefore, avoiding liability altogether is extremely
difficult if a party had any degree of involvement at a CERCLA site.
16 42

U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1) (2006).
U.S.C. §§ 2701-2707 (2006).
1 Id. § 2701(a)(2), (c)(1). The DERP requires that restoration activities be conducted in
accordance with, and in a manner consistent with CERCLA, and gives the Secretary of
Defense the basic responsibility to carry out "all response actions with respect to releases
of hazardous substances" from DOD facilities. Id See DERP program discussion infra
p. 448. While this article focuses on DOD environmental liabilities, it is important to
note that other government agencies have significant environmental cleanup costs as
well. For instance, the Department of Energy's Environmental Management Program
was established in 1989 to clean up the environmental legacy of nuclear weapons
production and nuclear energy research from the Cold War. See DEPARTMENT OF
17 10

ENERGY FY 2008 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET REQUEST: ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT,

Volume 5, DOE/CF-0 18 (February 2007), availableat
http://www.cfo.doe.gov/budget/08budget/Content/Volumes/Vol_5_EM.pdf. DOE's
fiscal year 2006 Environmental Management appropriation was over $6.5 billion. Id. at
7.
19 The absence of fault, the exercise of due care, and good faith prevention efforts are all
irrelevant to the issue of liability. See United States. v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810
F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986).
20 See United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506, 1513 (11th Cir. 1997) ("By imposing
liability upon former owners and operators, Congress manifested a clear intent to reach
conduct preceding CERCLA's enactment.").
21 See e.g. United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1059-60 (C.D. Cal. 1987)
(discussing that joint and several liability promotes legislative intent); New York v. Shore
Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2nd Cir. 1985); In Re Bell Petroleum, 3 F.3d 889 (5th Cir.
1993); United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711 (2nd Cir. 1993).
22 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (2006). The defenses are: (1) an act of God; (2) an act of war; and
(3) an act or omission of a third party exercising due care, other than an employee, agent

of, or one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual relationship with
a PRP. Id.
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Where multiple parties exist, liability may be apportioned among various
responsible parties if the harm is reasonably divisible. 2 3 Once liability is
established, the focus shifts to allocation of costs among responsible
parties. 24 Courts have considered various factors in their efforts to
equitably allocate costs among PRPs. 25 Court allocations have varied
widely, covering the full range of allocation between owners, operators,
arrangers, and transporters. 26 In cases involving DOD and its contractors,
results have also varied, sometimes with very unfavorable allocations for
DOD.2 7
DOD is potentially liable under every category of "responsible
party" under the CERCLA scheme due to both its vast property holdings

See United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F. 2d 252, 268-69 (3d
Cir. 1992).
See Control Data Corp. v. SCSC Corp., 53 F.3d 930, 935 (8th Cir. 1995).
25 Id. Noting the widely used "Gore factors," which
consider: (1) the ability of the
parties to demonstrate that their contribution to a discharge, release, or disposal of a
hazardous waste can be distinguished; (2) the amount of hazardous waste involved; (3)
the degree of toxicity of the hazardous waste; (4) the degree of involvement by the parties
in the generation, transportation, treatment, storage, or disposal of the hazardous waste;
(5) the degree of care exercised by the parties with respect to the hazardous waste
concerned, taking into account the characteristics of such hazardous waste; and (6) the
degree of cooperation by the parties with Federal, State, or local officials to prevent any
harm to the public health or environment. Id.
26
See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Aero Indust., Inc. 998 F.2d 842 (10th Cir. 1993) (25%
allocated to owner/operator, 75% allocated to arranger/ transporter (divided among four
arrangers)); Amoco Oil Co. v. Dingwell, 690 F.Supp. 78 (D. Me. 1988), af'd,884 F.2d
629 (1st Cir. 1989) (65% allocated to owner/operator, 35% allocated to arranger/
transporter (divided among 15 arrangers)); BCW Ass'n Ltd .v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp., 1988 WL 102641 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (one third allocated to owner, two thirds
allocated to operator); Cadillac Fairview/Cal., Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 299 F.3d 1019
(9th Cir. 2002) (100% allocated to owner (allocated to the United States as both owner of
hazardous material and the arranger of its production), 0% allocated to operator); Danella
Sw. v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 775 F. Supp. 1227 (E.D. Mo. 1991) (100% allocated to
arranger/ generator, 0% allocated to transporter); Envtl. Transp. Sys., Inc. v. ENSCO,
Inc., 969 F.2d 503 (7th Cir. 1992) (0% allocated to arranger/ generator, 100% allocated to
transporter).
27
See United States v. Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2002) (100% allocation to
the United States); Cadillac Fairview/Cal., Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 299 F.3d 1019 (9th
Cir. 2002) (100% allocation to the United States).
23

24
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and its various long-running defense-related activities.28 It is responsible
as a current owner and operator, with 21,192 total DERP sites at active
installations reported in Fiscal Year ("FY") 2005.29 One of DOD's most
expensive currently owned sites is the Rocky Mountain Arsenal in
Colorado, which has received over $1.4 billion in DERP funding as of FY
2005, with estimated completion costs in excess of an additional $500
million. 30
DOD also faces significant liability as a past owner and operator
due to the strict and retroactive aspects of CERCLA liability. Accordingly,
DOD is exposed to potential CERCLA liability at every installation owned
by, and at every facility operated by, any of the armed services or other
DOD entities (such as the Defense Logistics Agency ("DLA")), for any
activity that occurred at any time in the history of that entity.3 1
One example of significant DOD liability as a past owner is found
in the CadillacFairview/California,Inc. v. Dow Chemical Company case,
which discusses DOD's CERCLA liability for WWII-era activities at one
particular site. 32 During WWII, the United States government created the
"Rubber Reserve," a group of agencies tasked with creating, practically
overnight, a domestic synthetic rubber industry to support the war effort.3 3
To accomplish this mission, the government entered into agreements to
finance and retain ownership of manufacturing facilities, which private
companies would lease from the government and operate in exchange for
management fees and royalties. 34 The Rubber Reserve paid all of the
DOD is comprised of the armed services (Army, Navy, Air Force) and other subagencies which are usually the PRP under CERCLA rather than DOD proper. For the
purposes of this article however, I will simply refer to DOD as the PRP.
FY 2005 DERPReport,supra note 5, at Figure 14: DOD Active Installations Summary
28

Status as of September 30, 2005. The DERP has different programs which are designed
to address different types of these sites which are currently owned by DOD. Id.
30

FY 2005 DERPReport, supra note 5, at Appendix I: Installation Narrative Summaries.
illustrate the magnitude of this potential liability exposure, consider that the U.S.
Army was formed in, and has continually existed since 1775, a year before the
Declaration of Independence was signed and the United States as a country was born.
See AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY VOLUME I, THE UNITED STATES ARMY AND THE
FORGING OF ANATION 1775-1917, at V. (Richard W. Stewart ed., 2005), available at
http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/AMH-V1/index.htm.
32 Cadillac Fairview v. Dow Chem. Co., 299 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2002).
3
1 d. at 1022.
3' To

34

d

447

Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv., Vol. 14, No. 3
operating expenses and private companies with the requisite expertise
managed the facilities. 35 Corporations such as Goodyear, Dow Chemical,
and Shell Oil contributed to the rubber production, which created toxic
waste. In 1983, a developer that purchased one of the former rubber
manufacturing sites in Torrance, California, brought suit to cover the
expenses for investigating and cleaning up the site. The court allocated
100% of the remediation expense to the United States.
DOD also faces CERCLA liability where it was involved in
arranging for the treatment or disposal of hazardous waste, or where the
materials were government owned.38 In short, DOD's exposure to
potential liability under CERCLA is vast, requiring considerable
assessment and planning to ensure DOD can meet the financial burdens
associated with its cleanup obligations.
B. Satisfying the Liability - Which Pot of Money?
DOD pays for its CERCLA liabilities from different
appropriations, or "pots" of federal money. The first pot, the Defense
Environmental Restoration Account ("DERA"), contains funds which are
appropriated by Congress annually as part of the DOD Appropriations
Act. That appropriation provides funds specifically to enable DOD to
perform its agency responsibilities under CERCLA. The second pot, the
"Judgment Fund," contains funds that are available to pay for litigation
and compromise settlements entered into generally on the part of the
United States. 39 Each of these pots of money may be utilized only under
limited circumstances and for specific activities.

36 Id.

Id. at 1024.

" See id.
3 See United States v. Shell
Oil Co., 294 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2002) (court allocated
100% of the costs associated with government-owned benzol waste to the U.S. at the
McColl Superfund Site in Fullerton, California).
3931
U.S.C. § 1304 (2006) (The Judgment Fund is codified at 31 U.S.C. § 1304,
it is not a
DOD specific appropriation.).
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1. The Defense Environmental Restoration Account
The DERP was created in 1986 as part of SARA.4 0 It provides
DOD authority to respond to all types of releases from its facilities. 4 1 The
primary component of the DERP is the Installation Restoration Program
("IRP") which is aimed at remediation of past contamination. 42
Specifically, the IRP is designed to carry out "response actions." 43 In FY
2005, DOD invested approximately $1.3 billion in Environmental
Restoration ("ER") funding for environmental restoration activities alone
at active installations and formerly used defense site ("FUDS")
properties." Of this amount, which remained consistent with ER spending
levels for the last decade, $1.2 billion was for the IRP. 45 The Defense
Environmental Restoration Account ("DERA"), which was also created
under the SARA amendments, is the funding source for the DERP. Each
year, Congress appropriates DERA money into five separate ER accounts
for the various service components and DOD agencies to fulfill their

40
41
42

42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (2006).
10 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1) (2006).

See OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, MANAGEMENT GUIDANCE FOR

§ 6.1.1 (Sept. 2001), available
at https://www.denix.osd.mil/denix/Public/ES-Programs/Cleanup/guida.html [hereinafter
2001 DERP Management Guidance].
Other components include: the Military Munitions Response Program
("MMRP"), id § 6.1.2 (designed to manage responses to military munitions sites which
not only involve cleanup issues encountered at typical CERCLA sites, but also explosives
safety issues); the Building Demolition/Debris Removal Program (BD/DR), id. § 6.1.3
(designed to remove unsafe buildings); and the Formerly Used Defense Sites Program
(FUDS), id. § 9, § 9.2 (addresses "real property that was formerly owned by" DOD or
where activities were conducted by contractors but "accountability" rested with DOD;

THE DEFENSE ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION PROGRAM

i.e., government-owned, contractor-operated (GOCO) properties).
The FUDS program is managed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers as DOD's
Executive Agent. Id. § 9.
43 "Response actions" are defined in the IRP, consistent with CERCLA, as "the
identification, investigation, and removal actions, remedial actions, or a combination of
removal and remedial actions." Id. § 6.1.1.
44FY2005 DERPReport, supranote 5, at Appendix E: Restoration Budget Summary, E1.
45 FY 2005 DERPReport, supranote 5, at 3.
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DERP responsibilities.4 6 Moreover, funding for environmental restoration
activities at installations that are closing or realigning pursuant to the Base
Realignment and Closure ("BRAC") statutes is provided through separate
BRAC accounts, but environmental restoration at BRAC installations is
still managed as part of the DERP.4 7
Generally, when DOD faces liability under CERCLA based upon
its current ownership of a contaminated site, its restoration activities fall
within the DERP, and DERA funds cover the associated costs. In such
cases, funding comes from the appropriate service ER account on an
active installation or, from a BRAC account if the installation is realigning
or closing. Where DOD is a former owner at a site upon which
contamination occurred during its ownership, the FUDS component of
DERP generally manages the restoration activity, and the ER, FUDS
account pays the costs.
DOD typically encounters operator-type liability in situations
where it assisted in the design or installation of production facilities or
processes. Operator liability may also arise where DOD had inspectors or
other government employees on-site managing a contractor's daily
operations. DOD's arranger-type liability normally results from sending
wastes containing hazardous substances to a disposal or treatment facility
that is subsequently found to be contaminated. Properties that fall into one
of these two categories are referred to as "third-party sites" ("TPS").4 8
By definition, a TPS is not "on real property that is or was owned,
controlled, or otherwise under the jurisdiction of DOD," 49 but where DOD
is nonetheless a PRP under CERCLA. DOD's TPS liabilities are generally
paid from the Judgment Fund, not from DERA.

See Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 108-287, 118
Stat. 951 (2004); FY 2005 DERPReport, supra note 5, at Appendix E: Restoration
Budget Summary, E-2. The five accounts are ER, Army; ER, Navy; ER, Air Force; ER,
FUDS; and ER, Defense-Wide. FY2005 DERP Report, supra note 5, at Appendix E:
Restoration Budget Summary, E-2.
47 2001 DERP Management Guidance,supra note 42, § 8; FY 2005 DERP
Report,supra
note 5, at Appendices C, E.
48 For the definition of "third party site" see 2001
DERP Management Guidance, supra
note 44, § 3.2.2.
46

49

Id § 3.2.2.
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2. The Judgment Fund
The Judgment Fund5 o is a permanent and indefinite
appropriation. 5 "[I]t has no fiscal year limitations, there is no limit on the
amount of the appropriation, and there is no need for Congress to
appropriate funds to it annually or otherwise."5 2 "It is, in effect, standing
authority to disburse money from the general fund of the Treasury." 53 The
Judgment Fund is only available for money judgments, awards, and
compromise settlements which are "not otherwise provided for" and
"final," and is only available upon certification of the Comptroller
General.5 4 Funds are deemed "not otherwise provided for" if no other
source of funds specified by any statute is legally available to pay the
liability.'5 "[A] judgment against the United States is final for payment
purposes when the appellate process is completed." 5 6 Where a portion of a
claim can be divided for purposes of decision or judgment, judgments as
to discrete parties or claims are considered final, as are compromise
settlements, since they can not be appealed.

5o 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (2006).
51 See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, PRINCIPLES OF
FEDERAL APPROPRIATION LAW 14-12 (2d. ed. 1994), availableat

http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/og94033.pdf.
5

2 id

Id.
54 id.
5

ss Id. at 14-24 to 58. If a judgment is properly payable from the judgment appropriation,
then payment of that judgment from agency funds violates 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a),
commonly known as the "Purpose" Statute, which requires that all appropriations must
be spent for their proper purpose. Id. at 14-26.
1 Id. at 14-59.
s7 Id. at 14-60 to 61. For DOD's TPS liability, compromise settlements of discrete
portions of larger claims that are still pending (e.g. a party's past response costs) may be
paid. So long as the criteria normally applied are otherwise satisfied with respect to
particular CERCLA contribution judgments and Justice Department compromise
settlements, those awards will normally be payable from the Judgment Fund. See U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DECISIONS OF THE COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE U.S.,

DECISION B-253179, THE JUDGMENT FUND AND LITIGATIVE AWARDS UNDER THE
COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT,

REP. No. GAO/OGC 94-10 (1993), availableat

http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat4/150585.pdf.
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In the case of DOD CERCLA liabilities, the Judgment Fund is
typically used to pay TPS cleanup costs resulting from judgment or
settlements in three broad categories: response costs, oversight costs, and
natural resource damage claims. Response costs are costs pertaining to
studying or remediating a site. 8 Oversight costs are paid to a
governmental agency, normally the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA"), to cover the costs of its regulatory review and approval of the
studies, the remedy, and work that is carried out at each site. Natural
resource59 damage claims must also sometimes be paid for interim or
residual damages to natural resources which are incurred notwithstanding
the remedial action at the site. 60
Procedurally, these costs arise in several ways. If the EPA
performs the investigation and cleanup actions at a site (using Superfund 6 1
dollars), it may then seek to recover these costs from private parties, either
administratively or judicially. 62 The private parties may then pursue
contribution claims against DOD. A state agency may perform the same
investigation and cleanup actions as the EPA, and seek a similar recovery
from either private parties or directly from DOD. The private parties may,
again, pursue DOD for contribution. Also, the EPA may compel,
administratively or judicially, private PRPs to conduct the site
investigation and cleanup, and seek to recover past and future response
costs. Again, the private parties may seek contribution from DOD if all of
the statutory prerequisites are satisfied.64

58

Response costs are not specifically defined by CERCLA, but courts have held that they
include the costs of investigations, monitoring, testing, legal costs, expert witness fees, as
well as normal cleanup costs. See, e.g., United States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., Inc.,
810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986).
s543 C.F.R. § 11.14(z) (2006).
60 2001 DERP Management Guidance,
supra note 44, § 25.
61 The Hazardous Substance Response
Trust Fund ("Superfund") was created by Section
221 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §9631, and repealed by Section 517(c)(1), Pub. L. No. 99499, 100 Stat. 1774 (1986), and then continued as the "Hazardous Substance Superfund"
under Section 517 of SARA, 100 Stat. 1613, 1772 (adding 26 U.S.C. §9507 to the
Internal Revenue Code).
62 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606-9607
(2006).
61 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613
(2006).
6 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f).
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In sum, DOD overtly incurs environmental costs administratively,
judicially, by contribution, and through settlements. It pays for these
liabilities with the DERA and the Judgment Fund. DOD's owner-type
sites are easier to plan and budget for, compared to third-party sites,
because they are a known quantity. Given the often fact-intensive
equitable allocations at all types of sites, however, DOD still faces
uncertainty in its environmental costs. Congress appropriates funds, in the
billions to date,6 5 to satisfy these liabilities in compliance with the
equitable framework of CERCLA such that when DOD is the polluter, it
pays its fair share.
Notwithstanding the complexities of attempting to predict and
budget for cleanup costs at sites presently owned by DOD, budgetary
uncertainties are exacerbated when, having already paid it's "fair share" of
environmental costs at a site, DOD pays for all or some of a contractor's
"fair share" of environmental costs at the same site. That situation arises
when contractors include their environmental liabilities as overhead in
their current contracts with DOD. In those situations, DOD pays these
covert environmental costs with funds which were appropriated to
purchase war materiel. The impact is often not felt, or even noticed, on a
daily basis by those who manage the DERP and work to satisfy DOD's
environmental responsibilities, because they are not involved with DOD's
procurement activities. Nor are those who spend DOD's procurement
dollars mindful of DOD's environmental programs and expenditures;
highlighting the lack of integration which leads to the fiscally unsound and
inefficient business practices that Executive Order 1342366 aims to curb.
DOD's environmental litigators and the Department of Justice will
spend untold hours and taxpayer dollars fighting for an equitable
allocation of liability between DOD and a contractor at a given site, only
to have DOD procurement activities allow the use of procurement funds to
satisfy those same liabilities. As a result, DOD isn't just spending its
procurement dollars procuring things; it is also spending procurement
dollars to subsidize contractor environmental liabilities. This incongruent
practice is not only legal under the current acquisition laws, but is actually
encouraged.
65
66

See FY 2005 DERPReport, supra note 5 and accompanying text.
See Exec. Order No. 13,423, 72 Fed. Reg. 3919 (Jan. 26, 2007).
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As a result, DOD contractors often pay less than their "fair share"
of environmental costs. How do they do this and who does pay for it?
The next section of this article examines those questions.
II. ARE DOD CONTRACTORS REALLY PAYING THEIR "FAIR SHARE" OF
ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS?
DOD contractors are often sophisticated corporations, operating
with a distinct profit motive. Greater profits can result from passing on
costs to others. As a result, DOD contractors have long sought methods to
shift their environmental costs back to the government. The government
does not make it difficult for them because current federal contracting
laws and regulations permit contractors to charge certain costs against
government contracts as indirect costs.
A. Allowability ofEnvironmentalCosts in Defense Procurement
Contracting: Industry "Cost-Sharing"
DOD contracts are administered by the Defense Contract
Management Agency ("DCMA") through contracting officers. Because all
costs in a government contract must be "allowable" under the Federal
Acquisition Regulation ("FAR"), 67 contracting officers are responsible for
determining the allowability of costs submitted by government
contractors, including environmental cleanup costs. The Defense Contract
Audit Agency ("DCAA") helps them perform this task by auditing costs
charged to the government contracts and determining allowability by
applying the rules set forth in the FAR. Currently, the FAR does not
contain a cost principle that specifically addresses reimbursement of
environmental costs. Consequently, the allowability of government
contractor environmental cleanup costs is evaluated by applying the
general cost principles found in FAR Part 3 1.69
Under FAR Part 31, costs are generally allowable if they are
reasonable, allocable, in accordance with applicable cost accounting
See Federal Acquisition Regulations System, 48 C.F.R. §
31.201-2 (2006)
("Determining
Allowability").
68
id.
67

69

id.
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standards or generally accepted accounting principles, and not made
specifically unallowable by regulation or the contract terms. 70 in
government contracting, there are both direct and indirect costs. Direct
costs arise under a specific contract and are charged directly to that
contract.7 1 Indirect costs are not directly identified with any particular
contract, but contractors are able to include them in their overhead or
general and administrative ("G&A") costs, and charge them to the
72
government. Environmental cleanup costs are commonly treated as
indirect costs. 7 3
The fact that a contractor incurs environmental cleanup costs does
not create a presumption that the costs are reasonable. Costs are
reasonable only if their nature and amount do not exceed those which
would be incurred by a prudent person in the conduct of a competitive
business. Historically, many of the contractor activities that caused
environmental harm occurred before the existence of environmental laws
and regulations generally and before the enactment of CERCLA
specifically. Accordingly, such activities were de facto "reasonable" at the
time they were performed. Consequently, the environmental cleanup costs
associated with those activities are generally considered reasonable under
the FAR.
Generally, costs are allocable if they are incurred specifically for
the contract to which they are being charged, if they benefit the contract
and other work and are distributed to them in reasonable proportion to the
benefits received, or if the costs are necessary to the overall operation of
the contractor's business. 76 Because environmental cleanup costs are
indirect costs that typically result from activities arising under a previous
contract, they are generally considered allocable to a current contract as
costs "necessary to the overall operation of the business." As such, they
70

1d § 31.
FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 31.202 (2006).
72 FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 31.203 (2006).
7 Major Cameron, FiscalLaw Update: Congress ProposesMajor Changes in the
FundingofMinor Military ConstructionProjects, Sept. 1992 ARMY LAW. 29 (discussion
on the allowability of environmental cleanup costs).
74
Id.; FAR, 48 C.F.R. 31.201-3(a) (2006); but see Bruce Constr. Corp. v. United States,
324 F.2d 516 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
7s FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 31.201-3 (2006).
76
FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 31.201-4.
7'
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are typically allocated as overhead or through the contractor's G&A
expense pool.77
Additionally, allocation of costs must follow the generally
mandatory Cost Accounting Standards,7 8 although government contractors
have the discretion to decide which specific accounting practices they will
use. They may use any generally accepted method of determining or
estimating costs that is equitable and is consistently applied. 79 Thus, when
environmental costs are charged as overhead, there are no specific rules
that govern; only general accounting concepts control the range of
contracts to which costs may be allocated. This leaves contractors
considerable discretion as to the range of contracts across which they may
allocate environmental costs. 80
Finally, in order for costs to be allowable, they may not be
specifically unallowable under the FAR or by the terms of the contract.
Just as the FAR contains no specific environmental cost principle
addressing the allowability of environmental costs, it lacks a provision
specifically disallowing environmental cleanup costs. Consequently, as
with the general allowability determination of environmental cleanup
costs, the unallowability of environmental costs are determined using the
general concepts under FAR Part 31; if a cost is not reasonable, it may be
specifically unallowable. For instance, if a contractor experiences
increased costs due to its own delay in taking action after the discovery of
contamination, the delay would be considered unreasonable and the
increased costs resulting from that delay would not be allowable. 8 '
Another example of costs that are specifically unallowable are fines and

n Defense Contract Audit Agency, DCAA ContractAudit Manual [hereinafter "CAM"]
at §7-2120.6 at 7186, availableat http://www.dcaa.mil/cam/Chapter_07_Selected Areas of Cost.pdf (last visited June 21, 2007).
79

48 C.F.R.

§§ 9903, 9904.

FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 31.201-1.
80 Under the Cost Accounting Standards, costs generally must be charged to contracts
in
the time period in which they are incurred. Costs are usually incurred for these purposes
when the bill comes due, not when the damage was done. Where a specific program or
business segment that may have originally caused the liability no longer exists within the
remaining corporation, it would be inequitable for the contractor to automatically allocate
the liability across only their Defense segment.
8 CAM, § 7-2120.5.
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penalties resulting from violations of federal or state law or regulation. 82
Cleanup costs are, however, generally considered distinct from fines and
penalties under CERCLA, and are therefore rarely unallowable under this

rule. 83
The DCAA Contract Audit Manual ("CAM") specifically
contemplates situations in which contractors are PRPs and further
recognizes that they may ultimately incur cleanup costs in excess of their
fair share under the equitable allocation scheme when cleaning up a site
pursuant to an EPA order. 84 In that case, the CAM states that only the
"contractor's share of the cleanup costs based on the actual percentage of
the contamination attributable to the contractor" may be allowable
environmental costs under the contract.8 5 The CAM further states that a
"contractor should not be denied recovery of cleanup costs if it complied
with the laws, regulations, and permits in effect at the time of the
contamination."86 Thus, while acknowledging the CERCLA scheme
exists, the guidance found in the Defense Contract Audit Agency's audit
manual directly undermines CERCLA's core "polluter pays" principle.
Linking reimbursement to compliance with laws and regulations in effect
at the time contamination occurred contradicts CERCLA's basic strict
liability and retroactivity tenets. Additionally, it not only permits, but
actually directs, DOD contractors to pass on their share87 of environmental
cleanup costs to the government. Such an approach stands the principle of
equitable allocation on its head.
The following hypothetical illustrates this point: two PRPs, the
United States and a government contractor have each incurred CERCLA
liability at a site. A court determines, based upon application of equitable
allocation factors, that each party's fair share amounts to 50% of the total
environmental cleanup costs. CERCLA, and the "polluter pays" principle
FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 31.205-15 (fines and penalties may be allowable if incurred as a
result of compliance with specific terms and conditions of the contract or the written
8

instructions of the contracting officer).
83 See Major Tomanelli, Allowability ofEnvironmental Cleanup Costs, Nov. 1992 ARMY
LAW. 31, 31 and n.141 (comparing42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(1) (remediation costs) with id.
§9607(c)(3) (punitive damages) and 42 U.S.C. § 9609 (penalties)).
8 CAM, § 7-2120.9.
85Id.
86

CAM, § 7-2120.13(e).
§ 7-2120.9.

87 CAM,
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upon which it is based, requires both the United States and the contractor
to pay their own 50% of the overall cost. Based upon current procurement
regulations and guidelines however,88 the government contractor has the
right to seek recovery from the United States for at least some of those
same costs. Even assuming that a portion of the contractor's "fair share"
of costs is disallowed for some reason, the United States will nonetheless
pay for more than its fair share. The current procurement scheme permits
contractors to seek reimbursement for their "fair share" of cleanup costs
under current government contracts, thus allowing them to circumvent
CERCLA's "polluter pays" principle and shift the costs of their polluting
activities to the taxpayers, rendering the phrase "fair share" something of a
misnomer.
DOD contractors often "forecast" their costs as estimates when
competing for government contracts. Accordingly, their final CERCLA
cost allocation and ultimate financial liability may be unknown when they
claim their environmental costs. The FAR does provide some limited
protection for the government from contractors receiving a potential
financial windfall through this process. In circumstances where the
(estimated) claimed costs exceed the (eventual) actual costs, contractors
have an obligation to reimburse the government under the FAR "Credit
Clause." 89 It requires "the applicable portion of any income, rebate,
allowance, or other credit relating to any allowable cost and received by or
accruing to the contractor" to be "credited to the Government either as a
cost reduction or by cash refund." 90 While credits for indirect costs (e.g.,
environmental costs) do result in an adjustment of the contractor's indirect
cost rate, such adjustments do nothing to prevent contractors from
charging all or some of their share of environmental cleanup costs to the
government in the first place. Thus, the FAR's credit provision operates to
prevent further inequity to DOD, but does not prevent the FAR's initial
disregard for CERCLA's equitable scheme.
The FAR's general allowability principles are inadequate to
prevent inequities resulting from what is, by definition, an equity-based
restitution system. Not only do these general principles fail to adequately
accommodate the equitable underpinnings of CERCLA, the absence of a
See FAR, 48 U.S.C. § 31; CAM, § 7-2120.
' FAR, 48 U.S.C. § 31.201-5.

8

90
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specific, black-letter environmental cost principle leads to subjective and
inconsistent reimbursement of government contractors for their
environmental costs. 91 The lack of an environmental cost principle that
accounts for and harmonizes the business realities of government
procurement and the equity-driven environmental scheme results in a
situation in which polluters do not pay their fair share and taxpayers pay
more than intended. That this is perfectly legal is all the more
disconcerting. This is not a new problem. It was identified in the early
1990s and resulted in a proposal for an environmental cost principle.
B. The DraftEnvironmental Cost Principle:Dead on Arrival
The initial attempt to formulate an environmental cost principle
came in 1987.92 That proposal attempted to make compliance costs
allowable and cleanup costs unallowable, except for government-owned,
contractor-operated ("GOCO") facilities that met certain criteria. 93 It was
subsequently modified to exclude the provision on compliance costs, and
ultimately was withdrawn after complaints by industry. 94
Revisions were later made to the draft cost principle, and in
December of 1991, proposed FAR 31.205-995 was completed by a joint
DOD and civilian agency group. 96 The draft was approved by the Defense
Acquisition Regulation Council and by the Civilian Agency Acquisition
Council. 97 The proposed rule was sent to the FAR Secretariat on May 20,
1992, for final publication; 9 8 however, due (ostensibly) to a moratorium
91An ironic result given that the FAR purportedly requires "any generally accepted

method of determining or estimating costs that is equitable and is consistently applied" to
be used. See FAR, 48 U.S.C. § 31.201-1. (emphasis added).
92 See Captain Gerald R. Kohns et al., A Primeron ContractorEnvironmental
Remediation and Compliance Costs, Nov. 1993 ARMY LAW., 22, 28.
9 Id. at 28 & n.55 (citing Defense Acquisition Regulation ("DAR") Case 88-127).
94 Id. at 28 & n.56 (citing Recovery ofEnvironmental Costs, CosT, PRICING AND ACCT.
REP. 5-7 (Fed. Pub.) (Mar. 1992).
9 FAR, 48 U.S.C. § 31.205-9 (Proposed 1991). See attached Appendix for full text of
the proposed Environmental Cost Principle.
96

See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP, OBSERVATIONS ON
CONSISTENCY OF REIMBURSEMENTS TO DOD CONTRACTORS, REP. No. GAO/NSIAD-93-

77 at 7 (1992), availableat http://archive.gao.gov/d35t11/147876.pdf.

97id.

98 Kohns, supra note 92, at n.58.
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on new federal regulations imposed by President George H.W. Bush, the
draft was never released for public comment. 99
Proposed FAR 31.205-9 made a contractor's costs incurred for
preventing environmental damage, properly disposing of waste, and
complying with environmental laws and regulations, specifically
allowable. 00 Costs incurred for correcting environmental damage were
disallowed, unless the contractor met certain conditions.'o' The rule
required the contractor to show that it (or the previous owner responsible
for the contamination) was performing a government contract at the time
the condition requiring cleanup occurred and that the performance of that
government contract contributed to the creation of the condition. 0 2 The
contractor was also required to show that it exercised reasonable business
judgment, complied with all environmental standards (applicable at the
time the condition was created), acted promptly to mitigate the condition,
and exhausted (or was diligently pursuing) all available legal avenues to
recover or defray the cleanup costs (i.e. insurance). 0 3 In addition, under
the draft rule, costs which resulted from liability to a third party were
unallowable. '
Just as the draft cost principle was being "finalized" in May of
1992, GAO released a fact sheet on its findings regarding DOD
reimbursement of its contractors' environmental cleanup costs. 0 5 A
sampling of only 10 contractors yielded estimates from $.9 billion to $1.1
billion in future cleanup costs.l 6 GAO noted that these estimates were
conservative, noting DOD's poor data collection due to inadequate cost

See REP. No. GAO/NSIAD-93-77, supra note 96, at 7.
100 Kohns, supra note 92, at 28.
101Id

9

See Lieutenant Colonel Cheryl Lynch Nilsson, Defense ContractorRecovery
of
Cleanup Costs at ContractorOwned and OperatedFacilities,38 A.F. L. Rev. 1, 6
(1994).
103 Id; see also Kohns, supra note 92, at 30 (regarding the pursuit of insurance policies as
possible sources of contribution).
Nilsson, supra note 102, at 6 (citing FAR, 48 U.S.C. § 31.205-9 (Proposed 1991)).
105
See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DOD ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP-Information
on ContractorCleanup Costs andDOD Reimbursements, REP. NO. GAO/NSIAD-92253FS (1992), availableat http://archive.gao.gov/d33tl0/147069.pdf.
' Id. at 1.
102
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tracking systems.' 0 7 The report did mention, somewhat hopefully, that as
of the time that GAO/NSIAD-92-253FS was published, DOD was
"developing an environmental cost principle to provide more definitive
criteria for determining the allowability of environmental cleanup
costs."' 08
In October of 1992, GAO issued a follow-on report with specific
observations on the consistency (or lack thereof) of reimbursements of
environmental costs to DOD contractors.' 09 The draft cost principle had
still not been passed, and contracting officers were still left responsible, as
they are today, for determining allowability of costs using only general
principles, which resulted in inconsistent treatment of environmental
claims and cost reimbursement decisions (as it still does today). Not
surprisingly, the report found that contracting officers varied widely in the
extent of investigations into possible wrongdoing by contractors in making
their environmental cost allowability determinations."10 The report
detailed the history of the draft environmental cost principle, and again
suggested that its ultimate adoption might provide needed guidance for
contracting officers."
The moratorium on new federal regulations remained in effect into
1993, preventing the draft principle from being adopted.1 2 In May of
1993, GAO again reported, this time in testimony before the House
Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Legislation and
National Security, that 15 of DOD's largest contractors alone estimated
their future environmental cleanup costs at $2.1 billion, much of which
would be reimbursed by DOD.11 3 GAO again highlighted the inconsistent
practices being used for environmental cost reimbursement, and called for
DOD to develop and implement specific guidance on reimbursement of
107 id.

isId.at 2.
' 09 See REP. NO. GAO/NSIAD-93-77, supra note 96.
I10 Id. at 1 ("Decisions on reimbursement varied from complete denial to reimbursement
in proportion to the government's share of a company's business.").
111 Id.

112 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP- Unresolved Issues

in Reimbursements to DOD Contractors, REP. NO. GAO/T-NSIAD-93-12 (1993),
availableat http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat5/149250.pdf.
113 id. at 1.
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environmental costs in light of the stalled draft cost principle.11 4 In the
interim, DCAA issued its first specific instructions on accounting for
environmental cleanup costs in an audit guidance memorandum."' DCAA
chose to treat environmental costs as normal business expenses.116 in
response, GAO pointed out the problems associated with treating cleanup
costs from prior years as normal business expenses under current
contracts, noting that cleanup costs often have no relationship to
production costs." 7 GAO further recognized the interplay between such a
reimbursement scheme and the CERCLA equitable allocation scheme.
Because environmental costs often result from strict liability, unrelated to
a contractor's fault, GAO noted that determinations about which costs can
be reimbursed is a potentially research-intensive exercise for contracting
officers." 8
Another major problem that GAO highlighted in the overall
environmental cost reimbursement scheme was the allowability of
profits.119 It noted that costs which are accounted for as G&A expenses,
such as environmental cleanup costs, do not allow for a profit.120
However, their investigation disclosed that Boeing, and six of the thirteen
largest defense contractors were charging prior-year cleanup costs to
overhead accounts other than G&A, meaning those costs included a factor
for profit.121 Theoretically, this positioned DOD to pay not only its own
fair share of environmental costs, but at least a portion of the contractor's
fair share of environmental costs through reimbursement, and pay the
contractor a profit premium on the contractor's reimbursed share.
In addition to GAO's continuing criticism of DOD's inconsistent
cost reimbursement practices, DOD environmental attorneys pointed out
that the interim DCAA guidance, which treated environmental costs as
114 Id. at 5. For the third time in a year, GAO suggested that the draft environmental cost

principle might "provide guidance" regarding the inconsistent treatment of environmental
cleanup costs. Id.
5
1 Id at 6 (referencing an October 14, 1992 DCAA memorandum issued by the Director
of Defense Procurement).
" 6 Id. at 7.
"17 id.
118Id.
9

"20 Id. at 6.
1 Id. at 7.
121id
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"normal costs of doing business," and thus applied a "reasonably prudent
businessperson" standard, was unhelpful 22 because environmental costs
are often determined through hard-fought litigation, not reasoned
corporate decision-making.123 Moreover, state and federal environmental
regulatory agencies, not the contractors, determine the actual cleanup costs
to be incurred by selecting remedies for sites based on CERCLA
processes, not best business practices.1 24
Conversely, numerous industry and bar groups opposed the cost
principle primarily because it made environmental costs presumptively
unallowable. 125 The American Bar Association Public Contract Law
section argued that the proposed principle's presumption against
allowability is inconsistent with the FAR's general framework, and that
the burden should not be on contractors to show that they acted
properly.1 26 While DOD's exposure to enormous cleanup costs was clear,
industry attorneys felt that the potential exposure for government
contractors was overly "broad." 27 They feared that promulgation of the
draft cost principle would "threaten to affect significantly the contractor's
business and the costs associated with working on government projects"
because under the new principle, costs would be presumed unallowable
and contractors would have the burden of establishing their
allowability.128 "By getting involved now (at the time the draft was being
considered)," they said, "contractors can influence the Government's
handling of environmental costs." 29 Influence they did.
In May of 1997, Director of Defense Procurement, Eleanor
Spector, announced that DOD was terminating the effort to develop the

122

Kohns, supra note 92, at 27-28.

i2 Id. at 27.
124 id
125

See Nilsson, supranote 102, at 6 & n.36 (citing Letter from Allan J. Joseph of Rogers,
Joseph, O'Donnell & Quinn to Mrs. Eleanor Spector, Director of Defense Procurement
(Jan. 14, 1992) and DOD EnvironmentalCost Principle,FED CONTR. DAILY (BNA)
(Aug. 13, 1992).
126 See Kohns, supra note
92, at 30.
127 Chris M. Amantea & Stephen C. Jones, The Growth ofEnvironmental
Issues in
Government Contracting,43 Am. U.L. Rev. 1585, 1590 (1994).
' Id. at 1634 and n.334.
129Id.

at 1634-35.
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environmental cost principle.13 0 Industry had won. One industry attorney
observed that "government auditors and lawyers remain uncertain as to
how the rules should be applied in individual cases," despite additional
guidance by DCAA in its CAM.' 3 ' He asserted that contractors would
have "more flexibility" in arguing the allowability of environmental costs
in the absence of a specific environmental cost principle.' 32
Contractors would continue to take full advantage of "costsharing" with DOD. It was legal, but was it equitable? Contractors were
suing the United States in contribution under the environmental scheme,
fighting for the most favorable allocation from the courts, then passing on
as much of their resulting costs, or, their "fair share," as they could
through their government contracts, without resistance from DOD. GAO
had highlighted the problems associated with DOD's reimbursement of
environmental costs, and suggested the passage of the environmental cost
principle, but to no avail. The problems associated with environmental
cost reimbursement did not end there however. Next, GAO identified
another issue; if the battle over environmental costs would, in fact, take
the form of "cost-sharing," GAO determined that DOD was not
adequately seeking such cost-sharing opportunities.
III. DOD COST-SHARING: A PROBLEM RECOGNIZED
A. The Genesis of the DOD Affirmative ClaimsProgram
Having repeatedly highlighted DOD's inconsistent environmental
cost reimbursement practices with little or nothing to show for it, GAO
turned its attention to a distinct but related DOD problem: inconsistent
environmental cost-sharing procedures. In July 1994, GAO reported that
the military services and DLA projected environmental cleanup costs of
$3 billion to clean up 78 GOCO plants and the Rocky Mountain

Michael T. Janik, ConfrontingEnvironmentalLiabilitiesAs a Government Contractor,
FED. CONTR. REP (BNA) (Sept. 8, 1997).
131id.
130
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Arsenal.13 3 GAO found that as a result of a lack of clear guidance from
DOD, the services had not consistently requested that GOCO operators
share in the cost of cleaning up past contamination. 34 During their
investigation, each of the services and DLA described a different policy
for cost sharing, and within each service the policy sometimes differed
from the headquarters to the command level.' 3 5 For instance, at the Army
command level, officials reported that most of the Army's GOCO
ammunition plant operators were indemnified against environmental
liability.136 However, at Army headquarters, a procurement policy official
stated that the Army does not indemnify contractors against environmental
expenses. 3 7 GAO highlighted the importance of identifying PRPs who
might be required by CERCLA to pay for a share of cleanup costs at DOD
sites, such as GOCOs, and who otherwise might pay nothing if DOD
failed to seek recovery from them.138 GAO recommended that the
Secretary of Defense provide uniform guidance to the services on costsharing to resolve the existing disparities.139
The recommendation met with the same results as GAO's previous
effort to promote the environmental cost principle; nothing was done. In
March 1997, GAO delivered a blistering report on the inconsistent costsharing policies and practices within DOD, highlighting the fact that GAO
had been reporting on increasing environmental cleanup costs and
inconsistent DOD policies since 1992, without responsive action from
DOD.1 40 In the absence of sufficient DOD guidance, they reported that the
'3 3 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP,INCONSISTENT
SHARING ARRANGEMENTS MAY INCREASE DEFENSE COSTS, REP. No. GAO/NSIAD-94-

231,
134 at 1-2 (1994), available at http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat3/152126.pdf.

Id. at 2.

135 Id. at 7.

Id. at 8. As support for their position, Army officials provided memorandums from
the Secretary of the Army, citing Public Law 85-804, authorizing the major command to
insert indemnification provisions into contracts with 19 Army ammunition GOCO plant
operators. Id.
1n Id. The official stated that Public Law 85-804 was not the basis for paying
environmental cleanup costs for GOCO plant operators. Id.
138 id
139
Id. at 11.
14 0 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP AT DOD, BETTER
136

COST-SHARING GUIDANCE NEEDED AT GOVERNMENT-OWNED, CONTRACTOR OPERATED
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services had taken widely disparate approaches to seeking out PRPs
associated with GOCOs with which to share in cleanup costs.141
"Notwithstanding [their] recommendations to do so, DOD has not given
the services adequate guidance for making decisions on whether and when
to seek recovery of environmental cleanup costs incurred by DOD from
contractors and other parties at GOCO facilities."l 42 GAO attributed the
inconsistent approaches to cost sharing, which yielded situations where
PRPs were not pursued, and the associated financial detriment, to the lack
of uniform DOD guidance on the subject. 143 Again, GAO recommended
that DOD issue guidance to its components to resolve the disparities. In its
recommendation, GAO noted that they had been reporting for five years
that DOD could pay hundreds of millions of dollars to, and on behalf of
contractors, due to inconsistent environmental reimbursement policies and
now, in addition, for inconsistent cost-sharing efforts. Yet, DOD had
failed to act.
Then Congress stepped in. In November 1997, Congress directed
the Secretary of Defense to provide guidelines to the services on
environmental restoration cost sharing and cost recovery by including the
requirement in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1998.144
SiEs, REP. No. GAO/NSIAD-97-32, at 1 (1997), availableat
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/ns97032.pdf..
141

id

42
Id.
143

at 2.
Id. at 3.
144
Recovery and Sharing of Costs of Environmental Restoration at Department of
Defense Sites Section 348, Pub. L. No. 105-85, 111 Stat. 1689 (1997), available at
http://www.gulflink.osd.mil/
medical/storyboard/getdoc.pdf?dbname=1 05_congjubliclaws&docid=f:publ85.105.pdf
It provides in relevant part:
(a) Regulations-- ... the Secretary of Defense shall prescribe regulations

containing the guidelines and requirements described in subsections (b) and (c).
(b) Guidelines.--.. ... the regulations prescribed... shall contain uniform guidelines
for the military departments and defense agencies concerning the cost-recovery
and cost sharing activities of those departments and agencies.
(c) Requirements.-- the regulations prescribed...shall contain requirements for
the Secretaries of the military departments and the heads of defense agencies
to(1) obtain all data that is relevant for purposes of cost-recovery and
cost-sharing activities; and
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On February 27, 1994, DOD finally responded by issuing a policy
memorandum to the services and DLA addressing cost recovery and cost
sharing activities under the DERP program.14 5 The policy requires DOD
components to: (1) identify all potential environmental restoration cost
sharing opportunities from PRPs at DOD sites; (2) investigate each
activity where cost-sharing potential exists to determine the likelihood of
success; and (3) pursue cost-sharing to the extent practicable by obtaining
relevant data, identifying any Defense contractor negligence or
misconduct, and initiating actions, where appropriate, to recover
environmental cleanup costs incurred by DOD.1 46
The policy sets forth a multi-step process, potentially requiring
significant time and resources to complete. First, the services must
investigate each activity in which cost-sharing may be possible and
determine whether the likelihood of recovering or sharing costs outweighs
the expense associated with pursuing an action. Then, if potentially costeffective, they must obtain all relevant data, which can cover long periods
of time and involve complex environmental and contractual matters. Next,
they must identify any defense contractor negligence or other misconduct,
requiring very fact-specific inquiries, which may limit or negate any DOD
obligation to indemnify or reimburse the contractor for the costs of
environmental restoration. Finally, they must initiate actions, including
legal actions, where appropriate,to recover environmental costs incurred,
or to be incurred by the services.
Presently, the DERP Management Guidance requires DOD
components to establish processes to identify other CERCLA PRPs at
DOD sites and to pursue them to either take responsibility for
environmental restoration or to contribute to the cost of response actions,
on a total recovery or contribution basis, as appropriate.14 The services
even have extra incentive to affirmatively pursue these environmental
(2) identify any negligence or other misconduct that may preclude
indemnification or reimbursement by the Department of Defense for
the costs of environmental restoration.
14s DOD Policy Memorandum (Feb. 27, 1998) (on file with author). The policy covers
both cost sharing and full cost recovery; thus references to "cost sharing" in this article
include "cost recovery."
146 dM
147 2001 DERP Management Guidance, supra note 42, § 16.2.
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claims. Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. §2703(d)(1) and (2), the DOD components
are authorized to credit their ER accountsl 48 with amounts recovered
pursuant to CERCLA for response costs at DERP sites attributable to
other PRPs or the negligence of DOD contractors.14 9
GAO had been identifying problems associated with
environmental costs and government contractors for years. CERCLA's
strict liability scheme had long captured the government contractors'
activities at DOD sites. DOD had finally taken a step toward reducing the
budget strains that environmental cleanup costs posed, specifically
identifying government contractors as obvious cost sharing candidates to
pursue, where appropriate. But, what is "appropriate" and who determines
it?
B. Government Contractors: "Appropriate"Cost-SharingPartners?
DOD components are required to plan, program, and budget DERP
and BRAC environmental restoration program requirements, to defend
those requirements, and to execute the programs in a manner consistent
with DOD fiscal and programmatic guidance.s Naturally, seeking to
have a PRP either take responsibility for environmental restoration or
contribute to the cost of response actions, on a total cost recovery or
contribution basis, is preferable to expending appropriated ER funds to
pay for response costs that represent the liability and responsibility of
other parties.'"' This is especially true when PRPs are so readily
identifiable, as is the case with government contractors. Why then, is
refusing to reimburse all or some of DOD contractors' environmental
costs not equally preferable to expending appropriated DOD procurement
dollars for response costs that represent the liability and responsibility of
other parties, particularly where, in many cases, those costs have been
judicially determined to be a particular contractor's "fair share?" Can it
really be said that DOD is conducting its mission "in an environmentally,
See DOD AppropriationsAct, supra note 46; see also FY2005 DERP
Report, supra
note 5, at Appendix E.
149 2001 DERP ManagementGuidance,
supra note 42, § 26.1.
1o U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION
4715.7 §5.6.4 (1996), availableat
https://www.denix.osd.mil/denix/Public/ES-Programs/Cleanup/DoDI/4715-7.html.
1st 2001 DERPManagement Guidance,
supranote 42. § 26.3.
148
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economically and fiscally sound, integrated, continuously improving,
efficient, and sustainable manner"1 52 when on the one hand it seeks to
avoid paying for a contractor's environmental costs while on the other
hand, it is readily paying those costs? Such a system certainly does not
attain the best value for taxpayers by spending funds wisely, buying the
"right things, the right way." 5 3
Each of the armed services now has an affirmative environmental
cost recovery program in place, but to what end? DOD environmental
practitioners who endeavor to pursue "appropriate" affirmative
environmental claims against government contractors under the existing
system will do so at the peril of their time and their agency's resources.
Determining which cases are "appropriate" to pursue requires exhaustive
analysis. The difficulty of such analysis is compounded by pursuing a
claim that may be charged right back to, and paid for, by the government.
Is it "appropriate" to pursue a case under the CERCLA scheme when
DOD is obliged to reimburse some or all of the costs that will be allocated
to a contractor? DOD must reconcile its procurement and environmental
cost sharing responsibilities in a coherent policy that will achieve the goals
of each, cost effective purchases from government contractors, and
equitable sharing of environmental costs with those same contractors.
IV. A PROPOSAL: PROMULGATING AN ENVIRONMENTAL COST PRINCIPLE
In the early 1990's, "no realistic estimate" of future environmental
costs to DOD existed.1 54 Actual DOD Environmental spending from FY
2002 through FY 2005 alone exceeded $15 billion, with an additional $3.8
billion appropriated for FY 2006.
GAO recognized the need for an
environmental cost principle as early as 1992 to help control DOD costs,
See Exec. Order No. 13,423, 72 Fed. Reg. 3919, 3919 (Jan. 26, 2007).
GAO-06-800T, supra note 2.
154 Kohns, supra note
92, at 33.
55
FY2005 DERPReport, supra note 5, at Appendix C: Environmental Management
Funding Summary, E-6. (DOD has spent over $1 billion in environmental restoration
funding alone per year for the past decade). Importantly, these substantial figures do not
account for the additional environmental costs being charged back by contractors under
their DOD contracts; those costs are paid for with DOD procurement dollars which are
not tracked with DOD's traditional environmental program costs.
152
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but still none exists. Consequently, government contractors continue to
charge environmental cleanup costs as overhead in their government
contracts, and the government continues to pay them. What's more, some
of those costs may have been incurred solely due to the fact that the
government successfully pursued the contractor via lawsuit as a PRP
through DOD's affirmative claims program, creating a disincentive for
DOD to pursue such claims despite the requirement to do so. Without an
environmental cost principle, contracting officers apply only the general
cost principles under FAR Part 31, with subjective, inconsistent, and
inequitable results.
DOD must promulgate a new environmental cost principle. From
an overall DOD perspective, such a principle would assist in reconciling
two costly DOD responsibilities, environmental compliance and
procurement. The environmental cost principle will provide common
language and a common standard for the environmental attorney and the
contracting officer to apply when determining allowability of
environmental costs. Contracting officers will have an objective standard
to achieve consistent results in assessing the allowability of contractor
cleanup costs, making budgeting for future years more reliable and
achieving cost savings by paying only for DOD's actual liabilities.
Environmental attorneys charged with carrying out Congress's affirmative
environmental cost-sharing directive will be better suited to analyze which
cases are actually "appropriate," spending resources only where a
discernable "delta" between a contractor's allowable and unallowable
costs render a case sufficiently cost-effective to pursue.
Industry would, of course, strongly oppose any such measure, just
as they successfully did with the Draft Environmental Cost Principle of
the early 1990's. Industry can be expected to urge that costs should remain
allowable simply because "that's the way we have always done it." Of
course, as is evident from this discussion, past practice does not represent
an efficient or equitable approach, and costs the taxpayers millions.
Another industry argument might emphasize that allowable costs
are part of the consideration paid for the goods and services that the
contractors provide, simply known as the "cost of doing business." Such
costs should be costs which are truly part of conducting a contractor's
actual business. For instance, environmental compliance costs, which
contractors incur to comply with environmental laws and regulations, such
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as costs incurred to prevent environmental damage or to properly dispose
of waste, might reasonably be considered "costs of doing business."
Environmental remediation costs for past business activities should be
paid by a PRP, however, as equitable restitution under CERCLA's
"polluter pays" principle. Furthermore, complying with the FAR is a
longstanding part of the consideration that a contractor pays to willingly
do business with the United States. Complying with a new environmental
cost principle, then, could fairly be considered a contractor's "cost of
doing business" with the government.
Contractors might also point to the limitation on the actual
environmental costs that they are permitted to claim for reimbursement
under the CAM.15 6 If a contractor incurs actual cleanup costs in excess of
their fair share, it is true that a claim for actual costs incurred will fail, and
only their fair share of the costs incurred will be reimbursed in accordance
with the CAM. 157 From a government contracting perspective, such a
result is entirely equitable. When viewed in light of the CERCLA scheme,
however, reimbursement of a contractor's portion of cleanup costs runs
contrary to equitable principles.
Environmental cost reimbursement issues are numerous and
complex. Simply promulgating an environmental cost principle does not
even begin to address them all; however, it would assist in resolving the
present inherent conflict between DOD's procurement and environmental
cost-sharing responsibilities. Integrating these functions would, in turn,
provide a net financial benefit for DOD and its shareholders, the
taxpayers. It isn't necessary to replicate environmental cost principles
advanced in the early 1990s, but it is necessary to promulgate something.
Such a principle should provide, at a minimum, that environmental
cleanup costs be presumed unallowable instead of presumed allowable, as
they are currently. This would place the burden on industry to overcome
the presumption and prove the allowability of their environmental cleanup
1s6 See CAM, § 7-2120.9 availableat http://www.dcaa.mil/cam/Chapter 07 _SelectedAreas of Cost.pdf ("The allowable environmental cost should only include
the contractor'sshare of the clean-up costs based on the actual percentage of the
contamination attributable to the contractor.") (emphasis added).
157 If a contractor ended up claiming excessive projected cleanup costs in a given
contract, the costs would be unallowable since the contractor may not charge as overhead
costs that they either never incurred, or never reasonably intended to incur.

471

Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv., Vol. 14, No. 3
costs, instead of DOD having the burden to prove that they are
unallowable. Savvy corporations, armed with a profit motive, should have
little difficulty in identifying and justifying allowable cleanup costs under
the new cost principle. On the other hand, the DOD bureaucracy will be
better suited to analyze environmental cost allowability under a common,
integrated standard, moving DOD closer to executing its overall mission
"in an environmentally, economically and fiscally sound, integrated,
continuously improving, efficient, and sustainable manner."

472

THE NEED FOR AN ENVIRONMENTAL COST PRINCIPLE
APPENDIX
31.205-9 Environmental Costs.
(a) Environmental Costs(1) Are those costs incurred by a contractor for:
(i) The primary purpose of preventing environmental
damage; properly disposing of waste generated by business
operations; complying with environmental laws and
regulations imposed by Federal, State, or local authorities;
or
(ii) Correcting environmental damage.
(2) Do not include any costs resulting from a liability to a third
party.
(b) Environmental costs in paragraph (a)(2)(i) of this subsection,
generated by current operations, are allowable, except those resulting from
violation of law, regulation, or compliance agreement.
(c) Environmental costs in paragraph (a)(2)(ii) of this subsection, incurred
by the contractor to correct damage caused by its activity or inactivity, or
for which it has been administratively or judicially determined to be liable
(including where a settlement or consent decree has been issued), are
unallowable, except when the contractor demonstrates that it:
(1) Was performing a Government contract at the time the
conditions requiring correction were created and performance of
that contract contributed to the creation of the conditions requiring
correction;
(2) Was conducting its business prudently at the time the
conditions requiring correction were created, in accordance with
then-accepted relevant standard industry practices, and in
compliance with all then-existing environmental laws, regulations,
permits, and compliance agreements;
(3) Acted promptly to minimize the damage and costs associated
with correcting it; and
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(4) Has exhausted or is diligently pursuing all available legal and
contributory (e.g., insurance or indemnification) sources to defray
the environmental costs.
(d) In cases where the current contractor is required to correct
environmental damage which was caused by the activity or inactivity of a
previous owner, user, or other lawful occupant of an affected property, the
resulting environmental costs are unallowable, except when the current
contractor demonstrates that:
(1) The previous owner, user, or other lawful occupant's actions
satisfy the criteria in paragraphs (c)(1) through (3) of this
subsection, and
(2) The current contractor has complied with paragraphs (c)(3) and
(4) of this subsection during the period that it has owned, used, or
occupied the property.
(e) Paragraphs (c) and (d) of this subsection do not apply to costs incurred
in satisfying specific contractual requirements to correct environmental
damage (e.g., where the Government contracts directly for the correction
of environmental damage at a facility which it owns).
(f) Increased environmental costs resulting from the contractor's failure to
obtain all insurance coverage specified in Government contracts are
unallowable.
(g) Costs incurred in legal and other proceedings, and fines and penalties
resulting from such proceedings, are governed by 31.205-47 and 31.20515, respectively.
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